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NOTES 




The Friends Corporation, a distributor of fine coffees, decided 
to eliminate part of its sales force following a slow-down in its sales. 
Monica, a 59-year-old saleswoman, had been employed by Friends 
for 12 years, while Rachel, a 24-year-old with similar job responsi-
bilities, had begun working for Friends only 18 months ago. Both 
Monica and Rachel had received favorable reviews from their 
supervisor during their most recent evaluations. As part of its 
reduction-in-force, Friends's management chose to discharge 
Monica and to retain Rachel. Monica filed suit against Friends for 
age discrimination. What evidence must Monica present in order to 
meet her prima facie burden? 
In 1973, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green1 created a three-part burden-shifting framework for resolv-
ing intentional discrimination suits brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The first part of the framework requires 
the employee-plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, which consists 
of four elements. The plaintiff must show that she belongs to a pro-
tected group,3 that she applied and was qualified for an open posi-
tion, that the employer rejected her application, and that the 
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's 
qualifications.4 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing her prima 
facie case, an inference of discrimination arises, and the burden of 
production shifts to the employer-defendant to come forward with 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.5 At the third 
stage, the plaintiff has a final opportunity to demonstrate that dis-
criminatory animus, rather than the employer's proffered explana-
tion, motivated the employer's actions. 6 
1. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). 
3. Title VII recognizes race, ethnic, gender, religious, and national origin distinctions. See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). 
4. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
5. See 411 U.S. at 802. 
6. See 411 U.S. at 804. 
832 
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Although originally proposed for cases involving discriminatory 
hiring practices,7 the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case has been 
modified to fit other contexts. For example, where the employer 
has fired the plaintiff and hired a replacement, courts have modified 
the second and fourth prongs of the prima facie case, requiring that 
the plaintiff demonstrate that she was qualified for the position she 
formerly held and that the employer replaced her with an individual 
outside the protected class.s 
The McDonnell Douglas framework subsequently has been ap-
plied to claims brought under the Age Discrimination and Employ-
ment Act9 (ADEA).10 Application of the framework to reduction-
in-force (RIF) cases brought under the ADEA11 has proven prob-
lematic given the particular circumstances of the RIF.12 A typical 
RIF case arises when an employer restructures its workforce, elimi-
nating one or more job positions.B Because the employer fires the 
plaintiff after eliminating her position, the plaintiff cannot show 
that the employer replaced her with an individual outside the pro-
tected class with the plaintiff's qualifications - the fourth prong of 
7. See 411 U.S. at 792. 
8. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1983). 
9. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994). 
10. See, e.g., Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985); Loeb v. Textron, 
600 F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979). 
11. The vast majority of RIF cases are brought under the ADEA. The arguments 
presented in this Note, however, apply equally as well to RIF cases brought under Title VII. 
12. In some RIF employment discrimination cases, the courts focus their inquiry on 
whether a RIF actually occurred or whether the employer has claimed falsely a RIF in order 
to conceal age discrimination. See, e.g., Hardin v. Russman Corp., 45 F.3d 262, 265 (8th Cir. 
1995) (concluding that a RIF did in fact occur); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448,456 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (treating the employer's structural reorganization as a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the plaintiff's termination). The scope of this Note, however, is limited to 
cases where the parties do not dispute the RIF itself but dispute why, given the RIF, the 
employer discharged the plaintiff rather than a younger employee. In this context, courts 
should not consider the RIF the employer's proffered reason, as some courts have done, but 
should require employers to explain why it chose to discharge the plaintiff. Compare Barnes 
v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457,1464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 {1990) (stating that 
the most common proffered reason for the discharge is the RIF) with Thombrough v. 
Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The question is why, given 
the employer's need to reduce his workforce, he chose to discharge the older rather than the 
younger employee."). 
13. See Robert G. Boehmer, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act - Reductions 
in Force as America Grays, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 379, 383 {1990). There are two distinct scenarios 
under which a RIF case arises, although both follow a restructuring of the workforce. Under 
the first scenario, the employer eliminates the plaintiff's job position. Under the second 
scenario, the employer eliminates a job position other than the plaintiff's position. Rather 
than lay off the displaced worker who formerly held the eliminated position, however, the 
employer instead lays off the plaintiff, replacing her with the displaced employee. In other 
words, the displaced employee "bumps" the plaintiff. This Note focuses on the former 
scenario, which has proven problematic for the courts at the prima facie stage. Courts prop-
erly may evaluate the latter scenario under the McDonnell Douglas framework as applied to 
the firing context. Hereinafter, I use the term "RIF cases" to refer only to those cases where 
the employer eliminated the plaintiff's position. 
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the prima facie case. Consequently, courts have tried to modify the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in order to reflect the particu-
lar circumstances of a RIF, but they have not done so in a consis-
tent manner. Some courts ask only that the plaintiff show that the 
employer retained a younger employee in a position similar to that 
formerly held by the plaintiff.14 Other courts employ a flexible 
fourth element that requires the laid-off worker to present evidence 
"from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the em-
ployer intended to discriminate" without specifying what form that 
evidence must take.ls 
This Note proposes that courts require the plaintiff in a RIF 
case to show, as part of her prima facie burden, that the employer 
reassigned at least part of her job responsibilities to a younger indi-
vidual of equal or lesser qualifications. Part I describes the analyti-
cal framework applied to most intentional discrimination cases -
the McDonnell Douglas framework. Part II explains that the RIF 
plaintiff cannot meet the specific requirements of the prima facie 
case as articulated in McDonnell Douglas because her firing occurs 
in conjunction with the elimination of her position. This Part then 
examines two approaches taken by the courts with respect to the 
prima facie case in the RIF context and concludes that neither ap-
proach achieves the primary goal of the McDonnell Douglas prima 
facie case: prospectively refuting the most common legitimate ex-
planations for the employer's conduct. Part III recommends that 
courts adopt a prima facie case that requires a RIF plaintiff to 
demonstrate that she possesses equivalent objective qualifications 
to the retained, younger employee(s) and that her employer did not 
eliminate completely her job responsibilities but only her position. 
Together, these elements are sufficient to support an inference of 
employment discrimination in the RIF context. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 
Because the ADEA grew out of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act16 and because much of the language in the ADEA par-
14. See, e.g, Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
490 U.S. 1098 (1989); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983). 
15. See, e.g., Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); see also Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 
1990); Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1457; Thornbrough, 160 F.2d at 633; Selby v. Pepsico, 784 F. Supp. 
750 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1993). 
16. Section 715 of Title VII called on the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study of age 
discrimination. The Secretary's 1965 report concluded that age discrimination in the 
workplace was a serious problem that required congressional action. Congress agreed, and 
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allels that of Title vn, courts have transferred to the ·ADEA con-
text the standards and methods of proof developed under Title VII 
employment discrimination claimsP Thus, any evaluation of 
ADEA disparate treatment claims requires an initial examination 
of Title VII employment discrimination cases, the most important 
being McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 1B 
Under Title Vll and the ADEA, a plaintiff who alleges that her 
employer intentionally discriminated against her may present either' 
direct evidence of a discriminatory motive or circumstantial evi-
dence from which the fact finder can infer intentional discrimina-
tion.19 Evaluation of direct evidence does not pose much difficulty 
the ADEA became effective on June 12, 1968. SECRETARY OF LABoR, NEXT STEPS IN CoM-
BATING AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, 95TH CONG., 1sT SESS. (Comm. Print 1977). 
17. See Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985); Loeb v. Textron, 600 
F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979). 
Plaintiffs can prove employment discrimination under two distinct legal theories - "dis-
parate treatment" or "disparate impact." A plaintiff who brings her claim under the dispa-
rate treatment theory must demonstrate that her employer intentionally treated her less 
favorably than others because of her race, gender, religion, national origin, or age. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The disparate 
impact theory addresses employment practices that are facially neutral but allegedly affect 
members of a protected class more harshly than those outside the protected class. In this 
context, plaintiffs also must show that the employment practice cannot be justified by busi-
ness necessity. The disparate impact theory does not require proof of discriminatory motive. 
See 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; see also Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 117. Although ADEA cases can be 
brought under either one of these two theories, this Note focuses only on disparate treatment 
claims in the context of RIF cases. 
Some courts have held that the ADEA does not recognize disparate impact claims. Com-
pare DiBiase v. Smith Line Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995) (doubting whether the 
disparate impact theory is available under the AD EA in light of the Supreme Court's holding 
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993)) with Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 
953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (assuming that disparate impact liability applies under the 
ADEA) and Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (same). For commenta-
tors favoring extension of disparate impact liability to cases brought under the ADEA, see 
Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229 (1990); Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimina-
tion, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 715 
(1990); Marla Ziegler, Comment, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1038 (1984). For commentators opposed to the extension 
of disparate impact liability to cases brought under the ADEA, see Donald R. Stacy, A Case 
Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437 
(1985); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 
STAN. L. REv. 837 (1982). See generally Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the 
Age Discrimination Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 
507 (concluding that the Court is unlikely to extend disparate impact liability to cases 
brought under the ADEA). 
18. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
19. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 
(1983). "Direct evidence" refers to evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue. In 
other words, if a factfinder finds the direct evidence trustworthy, the evidence proves the 
existence of a fact without any inference or presumption. For example, in an age discrimina-
tion case where 59-year-old Monica loses her job, a statement by Monica's boss to the effect 
"we should fire Monica because she is too old for this type of work" would prove discrimina-
tory animus if believed. In contrast, circumstantial evidence, even if believed, requires addi-
tional reasoning before the factfinder can believe the proposition for which the evidence is 
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for the courts. The vast majority of Title VII and ADEA cases, 
however, do not involve direct evidence of discrimination because 
plaintiffs rarely come to court with the "smoking gun" in hand.2o 
Plaintiffs instead tend to rely on circumstantial evidence of employ-
ment discrimination. 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established guide-
lines for evaluating circumstantial evidence of employment discrim-
ination. In deciding McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set 
forth a three-stage analytical framework for the evaluation of em-
ployment discrimination claims. The plaintiff always retains the ul-
timate burden of persuading the court that discrimination 
motivated the defendant's employment decision,21 but the burden 
of production shifts between the plaintiff and the defendant in or-
der "to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to 
this ultimate question."22 This Part briefly describes each of the 
three stages of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 
A. The Prima Facie Case 
The plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case. In 
McDonnell Douglas, the Court identified four specific conditions 
that comprise a prima facie case of racially discriminatory hiring 
practices: 
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) 
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications.23 
offered. The truthfulness of circumstantial evidence tends to suggest the existence of some 
fact, but it does not prove the fact conclusively. To believe the fact for which the circumstan-
tial evidence is offered, the factfinder must make a leap in logic, such as an inference or 
presumption. In our age discrimination example, testimony from other older co-workers of 
Monica that they, too, felt discriminated against lends credence to Monica's claim if believed, 
but the fact that Monica's employer discriminated against Monica's co-workers does not con-
clusively prove that the employer discriminated against Monica. See generally McCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE §§ 185, 338 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
20. See, e.g., Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80,85 {2d Cir. 1990) (stating 
that, because employers rarely leave a paper trail or smoking gun indicating a discriminatory 
intent, plaintiffs often must build their employment discrimination cases from circumstantial 
evidence which undercuts the employer's proffered explanation); see also Holzman v. 
Jaymar-Ruby, 916 F.2d 1298, 1303 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no smoking gun in a 
typical age discrimination case); Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43,48 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (same). 
21. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 {1981). 
22. 450 U.S. at 253. 
23. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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Satisfaction of these four elements gives rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of discrimination.z4 
The Supreme Court made clear in Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine25 that it intended for the prima facie case to 
include "circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination."26 If there exists little connection between the 
prima facie case and the presumption of discrimination, the risk 
that the employer must defend itself against a frivolous claim in-
creases.27 The second and fourth elements support an inference of 
discrimination by eliminating the two most common nondiscrimina-
tory reasons offered by employers in defense of their actions28 -
the plaintiff's "lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in 
the job sought."29 The second element of the McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case therefore requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
she was qualified for the job sought,3° and the fourth element re-
quires evidence showing that the employer continued to solicit ap-
plicants for the position.31 Elimination of these explanations for 
24. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7; Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 
F.2d 633, 641 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas approach, if the plain-
tiff satisfies the requirements of the prima facie case, the factfinder must infer, in the absence 
of rebuttal evidence, the truth of the alleged discrimination. This should be distinguished 
from the more general prima facie case required to avoid summary judgment or a directed 
verdict, where the plaintiff need only produce evidence sufficiently probative of the issue in 
dispute so as to permit the trier of fact to find for the plaintiff. See McCoRMICK ON EVI-
DENCE, supra note 19, §§ 338, 342. In other words, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case in 
this second, less stringent sense when a reasonable jury may infer from the evidence, if it so 
chooses, that the alleged fact is true. 
25. 450 u.s. 248 (1981). 
26. 450 U.S. at 253. 
27. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United 
States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1213 (1982). 
28. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. 
29. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,358 n.44 (1977). The 
first and third elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case satisfy the statutory 
standing requirements of Title VII - that the plaintiff belong to the protected class and that 
she have suffered a harm. 
30. "Qualified" may have two different meanings: it may mean simply the minimum ob-
jective credentials or skills necessary for a particular position; or it may also encompass sub-
jective qualifications, such as "leadership" and "likability." The Supreme Court has not 
explicitly chosen between these two alternatives with respect to the prima facie case in the 
employment discrimination context. For a discussion of which meaning courts should adopt 
at the prima facie stage in RIF cases, see infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text. 
31. It may be debated whether satisfaction of the second and fourth elements supports an 
inference of discrimination strong enough to support a mandatory presumption of discrimi-
nation. Compare St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751 (1993) (Scalia, J.) 
("[W]hat is required to establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is infinitely less 
than what a directed verdict demands.") with Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(stating that proof of the prima facie case implies discrimination and raises not only an infer-
ence of discrimination but also creates a mandatory presumption in favor of the plaintiff). At 
a minimum, however, satisfaction of these elements identifies a plaintiff's case as one in 
which the factfinder reasonably might infer that discrimination underlies the employer's ac-
tions. See also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 
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the employer's actions increases the probability that a discrimina-
tory motive lay behind the employer's actions. As the Supreme 
Court explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters:32 
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of 
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unex-
plained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of imper-
missible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because 
we know from our experience that more often than not people do not 
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, es-
pecially in a business setting.33 
Consequently, the courts require the plaintiff to present evidence at 
the prima facie stage which directly bears on the two most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's actions. 
In recognition of the varying factual scenarios among employ-
ment discrimination cases, the Court stated that all the elements of 
the prima facie case as prescribed in McDonnell Douglas need not 
be applied uniformly in every type of case.34 Accordingly, the 
courts have adapted the four elements as circumstances require.3s 
B. The Employer's Burden 
Once established, the prima facie case gives rise to a mandatory 
presumption36 that discriminatory reasons motivated the em-
ployer's actions.37 The burden of production then shifts to the de-
fendant to produce evidence rebutting the presumption of 
MICH. L REv. 2229, 2243-54 (1995) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
case does no more than identify the plaintiff's claim as one in which discrimination may have 
occurred). 
32. 438 u.s. 567 (1978). 
33. 438 U.S. at 577 (citations omitted). 
34. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973). 
35. For example, where the employer has fired the plaintiff and hired a replacement, 
courts have modified the second and fourth prongs of the prima facie case, requiring that the 
plaintiff demonstrate that she was qualified for the position she formerly held and that the 
employer replaced her with an individual outside the protected class. See, e.g., Blackwell v. 
Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1983). 
36. While most presumptions rest on considerations of probability, see generally McCoR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 343, sometimes courts create a presumption when the 
opposing party has superior access to the relevant proof. As the decisionmaker, the em-
ployer can explain best why it retained an employee younger than the plaintiff. See Clara B. 
Bums, Comment, The Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination in Reduction-In-Force Lay-
offs: A Flexible Standard, 20 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 841, 857 (1989). Thus, in the employment 
discrimination context, some commentators justify the presumption on the ground that it is 
necessary to shift the burden of production to the employer. See Bartholet, supra note 27, at 
1216. Although this argument may have proved persuasive in 1993, the recent liberalization 
of discovery rules renders the argument significantly less convincing because the employer 
can be forced to state the reason underlying its actions through the use of interrogatories or 
requests for admissions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See generally Malamud, supra note 31, at 
2269-74. 
37. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981}. 
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discrimination raised by the prima facie case.38 Specifically, the em-
ployer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
actions.39 The defendant need not prove that its articulated reason 
actually motivated its actions; rather, the defendant need only raise 
a genuine issue of fact as to whether its proffered reason or a dis-
criminatory one motivated its employment decision. Once the em-
ployer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination raised 
by the prima facie case drops out.4o If the employer fails to meet its 
burden of proof, the presumption remains, and the court will enter 
summary judgment or a directed verdict for the plaintiff.41 
C. The Pretext Stage 
After the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for its actions, the focus shifts to the third and final stage of 
the analysis - the pretext stage.42 The plaintiff now has the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason was not 
the true basis for its decision. To meet this burden, the employee 
either may present evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer or may attack directly 
the employer's proffered reason by presenting evidence that raises 
doubt as to the truth of the employer's explanation.43 Although the 
presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie case 
has been dropped at this point, the factfinder still may consider the 
evidence used to establish the prima facie case in determining 
whether the plaintiff can meet her ultimate burden of proof.44 
38. See 450 U.S. at 254. 
39. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 7W., 802 (1973). 
40. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. 
41. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
42. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
43. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 
2754 (1993), the Supreme Court held that disproof of the employer's proffered reason does 
not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. In interpreting Hicks, courts have 
split over how high a burden the plaintiff now carries. Some courts have held that although 
disproof of the employer's proffered reason does not entitle the plaintiff to judgment in her 
favor, it does give rise to a permissible inference of discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. 
McMillon, 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir.1994); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 
1993); Moham v. Steego Corp., 3 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 1993). In contrast, other courts have held 
that a showing of pretext in the absence of additional evidence of discrimination is never 
sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 
6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993). See gener-
ally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the 
"Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991). 
44. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.lO. 
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II. CuRRENT APPLICATIONS oF THE McDoNNELL DouGLAS 
PRIMA FACIE CASE TO RIF CASES 
The realities of a RIF render strict application of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case impractical. Laid-off employees whose 
job positions have been eliminated cannot possibly show that their 
employer replaced them4s or sought applicants for a now nonexis-
tent position, as required by the fourth element of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case. Nevertheless, an employer still can en-
gage in age discrimination when reducing its workforce. Employers 
who consider age when determining whom to lay off violate the 
ADEA.46 Thus, the replacement requirement affords no protection 
against age discrimination in the RIF scenario,47 rendering the 
ADEA incapable of providing remedies for subtle forms of discrim-
ination. Most courts recognize this reality and wisely have chosen 
not to require ADEA plaintiffs to show that they were replaced by 
a younger employee following a RIF.4S 
In eliminating the replacement element, the courts are left with 
the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, 
which alone do not support an inference of discrimination.49 Un-
fortunately, courts have not been consistent in determining what 
additional showing is necessary to support an inference of age dis-
crimination in RIF cases. Section II.A examines the Coburnso ap-
proach, which simply requires that the employer have retained a 
younger employee whose job responsibilities parallel those previ-
ously held by the plaintiff, and argues that it fails to support an 
inference of age discrimination. Section II.B evaluates the 
Williams51 approach, which modifies the fourth element of the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case so as generally to require evi-
dence supporting an inference of discrimination, and argues that 
45. The Sixth Circuit defined "replacement" as "when another employee is hired or reas-
signed to perform the plaintiff's duties." However, "a person is not replaced when another 
employee is assigned to perform the plaintiff's duties in addition to other duties [already 
being performed], or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already 
performing related work." Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); see also Kesselring v. United Technologies Corp., 753 F. Supp. 
1359, 1364 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (quoting Barnes). 
46. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994). 
47. See McCuen v. Homes Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1150, 1151 (5th Cir. 1981). 
48. Courts properly may require a RIF plaintiff to show replacement when the plaintiff 
challenges whether a RIF actually occurred. If the employer sought a replacement for the 
plaintiff, the employer clearly did not eliminate the plaintiff's position. Under such circum-
stances, the employer's explanation for the plaintiff's discharge - the RIF - may be 
pretextual, an attempt to cover up a discriminatory reason for the discharge. 
49. See Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1988). 
50. See Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 u.s. 994 (1983). 
51. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 
u.s. 943 (1982). 
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this approach raises several procedural difficulties which confuse 
the analysis of the plaintiff's claim. 
A. The Coburn Prima Facie Case 
This Section examines one approach to the prima facie case in 
RIF cases, first espoused by the D.C. Circuit in Coburn v. Pan 
American World Airways, 52 and concludes that it is not an adequate 
reformulation of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case because 
it cannot support an inference of age discrimination. The Coburn 
prima facie case simply requires RIF plaintiffs to show that a simi-
larly situated younger employee53 was treated more favorably than 
the plaintiff.54 Plaintiffs often meet this requirement by showing 
that the employer dismissed the plaintiff while retaining one or 
more younger employee(s) in a position similar to that formerly 
held by the plaintiff. Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that they were 
more qualified than the younger employee(s) but must show only 
that they were qualified for the positions they formerly held.55 
Courts following the Coburn approach justify their position by 
pointing to the Supreme Court's dictum that "[t]he burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. "56 
One also could argue that the replacement element of the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case serves the purpose of demon-
strating inherently "suspicious circumstances" which give rise to an 
inference of discriminatory animus57 and that requiring plaintiffs to 
show retention of a younger employee serves a parallel purpose in 
the RIF context.5B Neither justification for a low-burden prima fa-
cie case is persuasive. 
The Coburn prima facie case does not function adequately as a 
preemptive strike against the employer's most common proffered 
52. 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983). 
53. A retained employee is "similarly situated" to the plaintiff if her job responsibilities 
resembled those performed by the plaintiff and if her position required similar qualifications 
and afforded the same status as that held by the plaintiff. Cf. Hill v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
729 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that the plaintiff must show that those 
retained were similarly situated in terms of qualifications and position). 
54. See Coburn, 711 F.2d at 342; see also Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 
893 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987). 
55. See Coburn, 711 F.2d at 343; see also Healy, 860 F.2d at 1214; Chipollin~ 814 F.2d at 
897; Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
937 (1983). 
56. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). For example, 
the Third Circuit in Healy v. New York Life Insurance Co. held that the prima facie case is 
easily made out because the focus of age discrimination cases centers on the defendant's 
articulated business reasons for its actions and the plaintiff's evidence of pretext. See Healy, 
860 F.2d at 1214; see also Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118. 
57. See Boehmer, supra note 13, at 400. 
58. See id. at 430. 
842 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:832 
legitimate reasons for its conduct because it does not establish that 
the plaintiff was at least as qualified as the retained younger em-
ployee(s).s9 In the RIF scenario, employers commonly justify their 
dismissal of an older plaintiff by explaining that the plaintiff was 
less qualified than the retained younger employee.6o Simply requir-
ing plaintiffs to show more favorable treatment of a younger em-
ployee does not refute prospectively the possibility that the 
employer believed the younger employee was more qualified than 
the plaintiff. Consequently, under the Coburn approach, an em-
ployer who properly focused on the relative qualifications of the 
employees when deciding whom to discharge during a RIF never-
theless may be presumed to have discriminated against the 
plaintiff.61 
In addition, the Coburn prima facie case fails as a modification 
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case because it does not sup-
port an inference of discrimination. Although the burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case should not be onerous, the burden must 
be high enough to support an inference of discrimination in order 
to protect employers from having to defend themselves against friv-
olous claims.62 In the RIF context, the suspicion aroused when an 
employer discharges an older worker instead of a younger worker is 
not strong enough to support an inference of discrimination.63 Un-
like non-RIF cases, where courts assume that an employer does not 
fire qualified employees, discharges pursuant to a RIF are not in-
herently suspicious in light of the employer's economic circum-
stances. Nor should the retention of younger employees be 
inherently suspicious. Because employers almost invariably retain 
some younger employees in a workforce reduction, especially in a 
large-scale reorganization, this fact itself is not suggestive of age 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33 (explaining that the prima facie case serves 
as a preemptive strike against the employer's most common proffered legitimate reasons for 
its conduct). 
60. See, e.g., Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1084 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(noting that plaintiffs were discharged upon a determination that they were the least effective 
employees in their department); Thombrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 
646 (5th Cir. 1985) (referring to employer's claim that the plaintiff was a less effective worker 
than retained employees); LaGrant v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir. 
1984) (describing a supervisor's testimony that a younger employee was retained over plain-
tiff upon a determination that the younger employee had higher performance evaluations). 
61. To raise a presumption against an employer who focused on relative qualifications 
defeats the explicit purpose of the ADEA - "to promote employment of older persons 
based on their ability rather than age." 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (1994). 
62. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
63. See Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1167 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that the fact 
that a younger employer assumed plaintiff's duties was insufficient to establish a prima facie 
case). But see Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir.) (re-
jecting the district court's conclusion that retention of a younger employee does not support 
an inference of discrimination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983). 
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discrimination.64 Other highly plausible explanations may account 
for the retention of the younger employee over the older one, such 
as superior qualifications, personality, or higher seniority. In the 
absence of additional evidence, the factfinder cannot determine 
whether a discriminatory motive is a highly probable explanation 
for the retention of a younger employee. Therefore, a presumption 
of age discrimination is inappropriate when the plaintiff shows only 
that the employer retained a younger, similarly situated 
employee.65 
B. The Williams Approach 
Rather than require the RIF plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
employer chose to retain a similarly situated younger employee, the 
Fifth Circuit in Williams v. General Motors Corp. 66 adopted a more 
flexible approach in reformulating the prima facie case in the con-
text of a RIF. The Fifth Circuit held that in order to establish a 
prima facie case, the RIF plaintiff need only produce "evidence, 
circumstantial or direct, from which a factfinder might reasonably 
conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching the 
decision at issue."67 This requirement simply asks the plaintiff to 
produce evidence sufficient to support an inference that the em-
ployer did not treat age neutrally, as required by the ADEA.68 
Once the plaintiff meets this requirement, the court proceeds to 
stage two and, if necessary, to stage three of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. Several courts have followed the Williams 
64. See Thombrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 644 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(explaining that the discharge of qualified, older workers pursuant to a RIF is not inherently 
suspicious because unlike ordinary discharge cases, where the discharge of a qualified worker 
raises suspicion because courts assume employers simply do not fire qualified employees, the 
discharge in a RIF case readily can be explained in terms of the employer's economic situa-
tion); see also Bums, supra note 36, at 856 (stating that the mere fact of discharge of a quali-
fied employee pursuant to a RIF does not create an inference of discrimination because the 
employer must discharge certain qualified individuals while retaining other qualified 
individuals). 
65. Public policy also argues against a low burden prima facie case in the RIF context. 
An easily established prima facie case invites laid-off employees to file suit whenever the 
employer retains a younger employee, regardless of whether the plaintiff can provide any 
additional evidence of discrimination. This result in tum may induce employers to lay off 
younger, more qualified employees instead of older workers in order to avoid litigation. See 
Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 647 ("[A]llowing an employee to bring suit merely because an 
employer fires him rather than a younger, allegedly less well-qualified employee ... may, to 
some degree, induce employers to lay off younger employees instead of older ones."). This 
practice undermines the ADEA's prohibition against consideration of an individual's age in 
its employment decisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994). 
66. 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). 
67. 656 F.2d at 129. The plaintiff also must establish that she is a member of the pro-
tected class, has been discharged or demoted, and was qualified to assume another position 
at the time of the discharge or demotion. See 656 F.2d at 129. 
68. See 656 F.2d at 130. 
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holding.69 Unfortunately, the Williams approach causes several 
procedural problems because it effectively collapses the pretext 
stage into the prima facie case. 
For many plaintiffs, the only evidence they can offer to demon-
strate that the employer relied upon age in making its decision is 
"pretext" evidence. "Pretext" evidence takes two forms. The first 
asserts the fallacy of the employer's proffered reason for dismissing 
the plaintiff rather than the younger employee. The second demon-
strates the employer's general tendency to discriminate against 
older workers, such as statistics that indicate an age disparity in the 
employer's decisions, off-hand remarks that disparage older work-
ers, or age-biased treatment of co-workers in the protected class.7o 
Under the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework, pretextual 
evidence is immaterial if the plaintiff fails to eliminate prospectively 
the most commonly proffered reasons for the adverse employment 
decision.71 However, under the Williams formulation, the plaintiff 
may introduce pretextual evidence in support of the initial infer-
ence of discrimination. For example, in Stumph v. Thomas & 
Skinner, Inc., 72 the 55-year-old plaintiff met his prima facie burden 
by introducing a statement by the company chairman that the com-
pany wished to eliminate its older workforce and by presenting affi-
davits from two older employees who voluntarily retired only after 
they experienced age animus from the defendant-employer.73 
In effect, the approach of the Williams court elevates the pretext 
stage to the prima facie stage if the plaintiff chooses to present 
pretextual evidence in meeting her prima facie burden.74 This ap-
proach, however, causes confusion by leaving unanswered several 
69. See, e.g., Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-84 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93, 95-97 (7th Cir. 1985); Thornbrough, 760 F.2d 
at 641-45. 
70. See Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 644 F. Supp. 906, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating 
that pretext evidence can take two forms: "1. through statements or other evidence expres-
sing an employer's discriminatory animus, notwithstanding any reasons the employer has ar-
ticulated, or 2. through evidence otherwise undercutting the credibility of the employer's 
proffered reasons"). Although evidence demonstrating general age animus on the part of the 
employer does not relate directly to the specific employment decision affecting the plaintiff, it 
does increase the likelihood that age animus underlay the specific decision at issue. 
71. See Malamud, supra note 31, at 2290, 2298-99; see also Selby v. Pepsico, Inc., 784 F. 
Supp. 750, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that evidence which indicates that the employer's 
explanation for laying off the plaintiff rather than a younger employee is not the true reason 
for its actions properly cannot be considered by the court until after the plaintiff has estab-
lished the prima facie case), affd., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1993). 
72. 770 F2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985). 
73. See Stumph, 170 F2d at 97; see also Hardin v. Hussman Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir. 
1994) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because there remained a material 
issue of fact regarding whether the employer's stated reasons for dismissal were pretextual). 
74. See Frank J. Cavaliere, The Recent "Respectability" of Summary Judgment and Di-
rected Verdicts in Intentional Age Discrimination Cases: ADEA Analysis Through the 
Supreme Court's Summary Judgment "Prism," 41 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 103 (1993). 
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procedural questions. In elevating the pretext analysis to the prima 
facie stage should the court consider all pretextual evidence at the 
prima facie stage or just enough to support an inference of discrimi-
nation, leaving the larger pretextual analysis for stage three? In re-
gard to the allocation of proof, should the burden of production still 
shift to the defendant once the plaintiff presents enough evidence 
to support an inference of discrimination or is such a shift justified 
only when the plaintiff eliminates the most common proffered rea-
sons for the adverse employment action? If the burden of produc-
tion does shift to the defendant, what specifically must the 
defendant show if the plaintiff has disproved already the employer's 
proffered reason for dismissing the plaintiff at the prima facie 
stage?75 
Moreover, the Williams approach ignores the fact that in struc-
turing the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Supreme Court lim-
ited consideration of pretextual evidence to the third stage of the 
analysis, after the plaintiff already has established a prima facie 
case. In collapsing these stages, Williams ignores the Court's care-
fully crafted procedural framework for employment discrimination 
cases.76 To help courts avoid this confused analysis, Part III pro-
poses a more logical and coherent approach that adheres to the 
function served by the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case - rais-
ing an inference of discrimination by prospectively rebutting the 
two most common, nondiscriminatory explanations for an em-
ployer's discharge of the plaintiff. 
III. REcoMMENDED REFORMULATION OF THE McDoNNELL 
DOUGLAS PRIMA FACIE CASE 
This Part argues that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 
should be reformulated in the RIP context to require a plaintiff to 
show the following: 1) she is a member of the protected class; 2) 
she was terminated pursuant to a RIP; 3) her duties were reassigned 
to a younger, similarly situated employee;77 and 4) that the younger 
employee was less qualified than the plaintiff. The first two re-
quirements simply meet the standing requirements of the ADEA 
75. For example, in Hardin, the plaintiff raised an inference of discrimination by present-
ing evidence which suggested that the employer's proffered reason for his termination - that 
plaintiff had one of the two worst performance records in the department - was pre textual. 
Hardin, 45 F.3d at 265-66. Assuming the plaintiff presented such evidence as part of his 
prima facie case, can the employer meet its burden of production at stage two by again stat-
ing that the plaintiff was dismissed because he possessed an inferior performance record or 
must the employer come forward with some other explanation or can the employer meet its 
burden by attacking the plaintiff's pretextual evidence? 
76. Cf. Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that 
the coUapse of the third stage into a single stage "would defeat the purpose underlying the 
McDonnell Douglas process"). 
77. For a definition of "similarly situated employee," see supra note 53. 
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- that the plaintiff is covered by the ADEA and has suffered a 
harm. The third and fourth requirements follow the principles of 
McDonnell Douglas by prospectively refuting the most common le-
gitimate reasons for the employer's decision to terminate the plain-
tiff78 and by requiring the plaintiff to come forward with evidence 
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.79 
A. Reassignment Element 
The requirement that plaintiffs show reassignment80 of their 
work responsibilities parallels the fourth prong of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case - that plaintiffs show that their employer 
either replaced them or continued to accept applications for the po-
sition. In the hiring-firing context, the fourth prong serves the pur-
pose of rebutting an employer's claim that it eliminated the position 
for which the plaintiff applied or which the plaintiff previously held, 
a commonly offered, legitimate explanation for the employer's deci-
sion to terminate the plaintiff.81 Evidence of replacement or the 
acceptance of employment applications demonstrates the em-
ployer's continued need for the work previously performed by the 
plaintiff. In the RIF context, reassignment of the plaintiff's respon-
sibilities to others serves the same function. When the employer 
reassigns the plaintiff's responsibilities, the ultimate question re-
mains unanswered - why did the employer discharge the plaintiff 
rather than one of the employees who assumed the plaintiff's re-
sponsibilities? In contrast, the complete elimination of the duties 
previously performed by the plaintiff suggests that business neces-
sity required the discharge of the plaintiff, thereby explaining why 
the employer chose to lay off the plaintiff rather than another 
employee.82 
78. See supra section I.A for a discussion of why the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 
supports a presumption against the employer. 
79. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981), the 
Supreme Court made clear that at a minimum, the prima facie case must identify "circum-
stances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." 
80. "Reassignment" occurs either when the employer reassigns some or all of the plain-
tiff's responsibilities to another employee who previously did not hold these responsibilities 
or when the employer eliminates the plaintiff's position but retains another employee who 
was assigned duties similar to those performed by the plaintiff before the RIF. 
81. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) 
(stating that one of the most commonly offered reasons relied upon by the employer includes 
"the absence of a vacancy in the job sought"). 
82. Some plaintiffs may argue that the employer made a bad business decision in deciding 
to eliminate the plaintiff's job. See Selby v. Pepsico, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 750, 756 (N.D. Cal. 
1991) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the employer should have reduced its workforce 
through attrition and not by firing the plaintiff), affd., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1993). However, 
Congress did not intend for the ADEA to protect employees against their employer's bad 
employment decisions. See Jorgensen v. Modem Women of Am., 761 F.2d 502, 505 (8th Cir. 
1985) ("The ADEA is not intended to be used as a means of reviewing the propriety of a 
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The reassignment element also requires the plaintiff to show 
that her work responsibilities were reassigned to a younger em-
ployee.s3 This requirement parallels the fourth element of the 
prima facie case of most hiring-firing cases - that the employer 
replaced the plaintiff with an individual outside the protected 
class.84 An employer who replaces the plaintiff with an individual 
who is also a member of the protected class dispels any possible 
inference of discrimination. For example, an employer who re-
places a fired female employee with another woman in all likeli-
hood did not harbor discriminatory animus against the fired 
employee on account of her gender. Similarly, an employer who 
reassigns an older employee's responsibilities to another older em-
ployee probably did not discharge the older worker on account of 
her age. 
B. Relative Qualification Element 
This section explains why courts should examine the plaintiff's 
relative qualifications as part of the prima facie case in ADEA 
cases arising out of a RIF. Section lll.B.l argues that an inference 
of age discrimination arises in the RIF context only after the plain-
tiff demonstrates that she was at least as qualified as the employee 
retained by the employer. Section lll.B.2 explains why the assess-
ment of relative qualifications should focus only on objective crite-
ria at the prima facie stage, ignoring subjective criteria. 
1. Advantages of Assessing Relative Qualifications 
Requiring the plaintiff in a RIF case to present evidence com-
paring her qualifications to those of the retained employee(s) paral-
lels the second element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 
- evidence that the plaintiff possessed the necessary qualifications 
for the position. In non-RIF cases, courts require the plaintiff to 
business decision on the part of [the employer]."). Instead, the ADEA only requires that the 
employment decision be based on factors other than age. 
83. Rather than require plaintiffs to show reassignment, courts simply could ask that the 
plaintiff demonstrate more favorable treatment of a younger employee in a position for 
which the plaintiff was qualified. Specifically, courts could require that employers who have 
eliminated positions transfer affected employees to other positions in the corporation for 
which they are qualified, even if this entails "bumping" the less qualified or less senior em-
ployees currently in these positions. See Boehmer, supra note 13, at 429 (stating that the 
ADEA plaintiff can establish a prima facie case where the employer fails to "bump other 
employees"). Although the employer's failure to bump younger employees may suggest 
preferential treatment, most courts have not treated the absence of a bumping policy as dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1083 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Barnes v. GenCorp., Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1469 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); 
Thurman v. Robertshaw Control Co., 869 F. Supp. 934, 939 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
84. Where the employer has not yet replaced the plaintiff, it is sufficient that the plaintiff 
show that the employer continued to accept applications for the position from persons 
outside the protected class. 
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show that she was qualified for the position because such evidence 
prospectively rebuts an employer's claim that the plaintiff lacked 
the necessary qualifications for the position, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that a discriminatory motive underlay the employer's ac-
tions. In the RIF context, because presumably all employees are 
qualified, employers commonly justify their discharge of the plain-
tiff not by arguing that the plaintiff was unqualified but by pointing 
to the younger employee's superior qualifications.ss Therefore, in 
anticipation of this explanation, evidence that the plaintiff is at least 
as qualified as the retained employee(s) is necessary to support an 
inference of discrimination and justify a mandatory presumption of 
age discrimination.s6 
In addition, the relative qualification element protects an em-
ployer from exposure to age discrimination claims every time it 
reduces the size of its workforce. Because employers almost invari-
ably retain a younger employee during a RIF, a prima facie stan-
dard that requires only that the plaintiff show retention of a 
younger employee invites litigation every time an employer lays off 
an older worker. This result in turn may cause employers to retain 
older workers over younger, more qualified workers in an attempt 
to avoid litigation.87 By increasing the burden placed on plaintiffs 
in establishing a prima facie case, the relative qualification prong 
lowers the likelihood that discharged employees will bring suit 
without adequate evidence supporting their claims of discrimina-
tion. Consequently, employers will not be exposed to litigation 
every time they lay off an older worker due to a RIF. Employers 
85. See Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466 (stating that one of "the most obvious explanations for 
the discharge of any one employee [is] lower proficiency"). 
86. However, where an employer was unaware of the plaintiff's inferior qualifications, 
courts should allow the plaintiff to satisfy her prima facie burden if the evidence suggests that 
the employer may have relied upon age in making its decision. For example, in Hardin v. 
Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff, a 51-year-old research engineer 
who was terminated pursuant to a RIF, never proved that he was more qualified than simi-
larly situated younger employees who were retained by the employer. Although the defend-
ant claimed that the plaintiff had a performance record worse than the retained employees, 
the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. The individual respon-
sible for determining who among the 54 employees in the plaintiff's department would be 
terminated met with his immediate subordinate for only 30 minutes, failed to consult the 
plaintiff's immediate supervisor, and did not review any employee personnel records. Suspi-
cious of the method in which the termination decision was made, the court determined that 
the plaintiff raised a material issue of fact with regard to whether the employer impermissibly 
relied on age in terminating the plaintiff. See 45 F.3d at 265-66. 
87. Cf. Alisa D. Shudofsky, Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title 
VII Litigation, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 553, 564 (1982) (stating that employers may favor less-
qualified minority individuals in order to avoid litigation if the prima facie case requires only 
that the plaintiff was qualified, rather than equally or more qualified than the nonminority 
individual). 
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then may focus on the relative qualifications of their employees, 
thereby realizing the purpose of the ADEA.ss 
2. Objective Comparison 
Although under Burdine the specific elements of the prima facie 
case must include "circumstances which give rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination,"89 this objective must be balanced against 
the Court's additional instruction that the plaintiff's prima facie 
burden not be onerous.9° Courts can balance Burdine's competing 
objectives effectively by requiring proof of relative objective quali-
fications only, ignoring subjective qualifications until the pretext 
stage. 
When assessment of a given trait can lead to only one conclu-
sion, such a trait is called an objective qualification. For example, 
when adducing an individual's educational background and previ-
ous employment experience, the personal biases of the evaluator do 
not influence her evaluation of such traits. Thus, objective qualifi-
cations are readily comparable, and courts can easily determine the 
more objectively qualified individual. In contrast, personal biases 
do affect the evaluation of subjective traits, such as leadership 
abilities and interpersonal skills. Reasonable people may differ in 
their comparison of two individuals with respect to subjective 
characteristics. 
Those who favor a comparison of objective and subjective quali-
fications at the prima facie stage argue that employment decisions 
rarely rely on purely objective comparisons among individuals but 
also require an assessment of subjective characteristics, such as in-
terpersonal skills and leadership abilities. Thus, a judicial evalua-
tion of relative qualifications that ignores subjective traits does not 
parallel real-life decisionmaking and therefore cannot as accurately 
88. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994). In hiring, firing, and promotion cases, the courts remain 
split over whether the plaintiff meets her prima facie burden simply by demonstrating that 
she possessed the minimum qualifications required by the position or whether the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that she possessed substantially equivalent qualifications relative to the 
individual subsequently hired or promoted. Compare Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656 
F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring only that the plaintiff meet the employer's mini-
mum requirements) and Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 347-48 (lOth Cir. 1975) 
(same) with Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1985) (re-
quiring substantially equivalent qualifications) and United States v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 
534 F.2d 805, 814 (8th Cir. 1976) (same) and Oliver v. Moberly Mo. Sch. Dist., 427 F. Supp. 
82,86 (E.D. Mo.1977) (same). Although the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve 
this issue in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, it chose not to do so. 
See 460 U.S. 711 (1983). In Aikens, a promotion case, the D.C. Circuit overruled the district 
court's conclusion that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was more qualified than other 
individuals promoted by the defendant. See Aikens v. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Gov-
ernors, 642 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
89. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
90. See 450 U.S. at 253 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case ... is not 
onerous."). 
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assess which of two individuals is more qualified.91 However, two 
practical considerations weigh heavily on the side of focusing exclu-
sively on objective qualifications at the prima facie stage. 
First, to require plaintiffs to obtain evidence of their own subjec-
tive qualifications, as well as those of the retained employee(s), 
places too onerous a burden upon plaintiffs. The personal observa-
tions of supervisors or co-workers may be the only evidence avail-
able with respect to subjective characteristics such as motivation, 
leadership abilities, and interpersonal skills. Plaintiffs, if required 
to demonstrate superior subjective qualifications, would have to 
spend considerable time and effort interviewing and deposing su-
pervisors and co-workers. Moreover, both conscious and uncon-
scious prejudices may color supervisors' and co-workers' 
assessments of plaintiffs' subjective qualifications.92 One easily can 
imagine a supervisor, believing that older people tend to be stodgy 
and slow-witted, wrongly evaluating an older employee as inflexible 
and slow to adapt to changes in the workplace. Alternatively, in 
anticipation of a RIF, an employer purposely may give an older 
worker a negative evaluation in order to justify her dismissal when 
the RIF actually occurs.93 In such circumstances, a plaintiff will be 
unable to establish a prima facie case because she cannot show that 
she possessed equal or superior subjective qualifications relative to 
the retained employee. 
Second, in addition to the evidentiary difficulties of demonstrat-
ing relative subjective qualifications, the plaintiff may have to spec-
ulate as to which traits the employer most highly valued, identifying 
all possible qualifications the employer may have considered. This 
requirement places upon the plaintiff a very high burden.94 The 
employer, in contrast, has ready access to such information and eas-
ily can bear the burden of identifying the qualities it considered and 
91. See, e.g., Aikens, 642 F.2d at 522 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
92. See Faye Crosby & Susan Clayton, Affirmative Action and the Issue of Expectancies, 
46 J. Soc. IssuES 61,66-67 (1990); see also Lewis v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 
915, 919 (D. Md. 1988) (stating that evidence that less qualified engineering associates were 
kept on at the facility is particularly hard to come by where layoffs are based on subjective 
performance ratings that may have been influenced by bias); Mack A. Player, Applicants, 
Applicants in the Hal~ Who's the Fairest of Them All? Comparing Qualifications Under Em-
ployment Discrimination Law, 46 OHio ST. L.J. 277,294 (1985). 
93. For example, in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979), the plaintiff's 
new supervisor moved to discharge the plaintiff, an international sales manager. The com-
pany's president blocked this action on the grounds that there was a lack of documentation to 
support termination of the plaintiff and suggested that the plaintiff be given specific assign-
ments so that his performance could be evaluated better. The plaintiff's responsibilities were 
changed, and he became area manager of Latin America. The supervisor fired the plaintiff a 
few months later on the grounds that he had not generated enough business in Latin America 
to justify his salary, noting "involuntary termination- poor job performance" on plaintiff's 
personnel records. 600 F.2d at 1008. 
94. See Player, supra note 92, at 289. 
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the manner in which it assessed those qualities as, between the 
plaintiff and the retained employee.95 Hence, it makes more sense 
to put this burden on the employer at stage two, rather than on the 
employee at the prima facie stage. 
Arguably, the discovery process provides the plaintiff with the 
means by which to discover the qualifications most highly valued by 
the employer, thereby eliminating the necessity of shifting the bur-
den of production to the employer. This argument, however, ig-
nores the realities of employment discrimination litigation. First, in 
response to an interrogatory asking the employer to explain its 
decisionmaking process, the employer has little incentive to be 
completely forthcoming in its answer and may offer the plaintiff 
only vague explanations.96 In contrast, defendants, in all likelihood, 
will explain in some detail their selection process during stage two 
of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.97 Although 
technically the employer need do no more than articulate a legiti-
mate reason for its decision,98 the fear that the factfinder will be-
lieve the plaintiff should the employer make only a minimal 
showing will motivate the employer to present detailed evidence.99 
Second, employers have an incentive to offer misleading or dis-
honest responses to plaintiffs' interrogatory requests. For example, 
suppose the plaintiff demonstrated superior leadership potential 
while the retained employee possessed better organization skills, 
and the employer was aware of their respective abilities. If in an-
swer to the interrogatory, the employer states that it values organi-
zational skills over leadership potential, the plaintiff will be unable 
to establish a prima facie case. The employer thus has an incentive 
to emphasize organizational skills over leadership skills, regardless 
of whether it truly values the retained employees' strengths more 
than it values the plaintiff's strengths, in order to thwart the plain-
tiff's attempt to establish a prima facie case. Consequently, if 
courts require plaintiffs to prove that they possessed equivalent 
subjective as well as objective qualifications relative to the retained 
employee(s), many plaintiffs will be unable to establish a prima fa-
95. See Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1985); Bartholet, 
supra note 27, at 1211-12; cf. Player, supra note 92, at 289 ("[R]equiring the employer to 
articulate the precise reason it selected a particular person when confronted with a choice 
between two objectively qualified candidates is logical and relatively easy."). 
96. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 27, at 1216; Player, supra note 92, at 289. 
97. See Bartholet, supra note 27, at 1217. 
98. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (stating 
that the defendant's burden is to produce evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone 
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and not to persuade the court 
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason). 
99. See Bartholet, supra note 27, at 1217. 
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cie case and will be denied a fair opportunity to show that age ani-
mus motivated their employer's actions.1oo 
Arguably, a- showing that the plaintiff possessed equal or supe-
rior objective and subjective qualifications relative to the retained 
employee supports a stronger inference of discrimination than 
where the plaintiff only shows equal or superior objective qualifica-
tions. However, in light of the practical difficulties in demonstrat-
ing subjective qualifications, fairness to the plaintiff requires 
ignoring subjective qualifications until the pretext stage of the anal-
ysis. Moreover, by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate equivalent 
objective qualifications to the retained employee(s), courts can dis-
miss those cases where plaintiffs are clearly less qualified than the 
retained employee(s).l01 Courts thus can protect adequately em-
ployers from having to defend themselves against frivolous claims, a 
primary purpose of the prima facie case.1oz 
CoNCLUSION 
Employers will continue to lay off older workers as they restruc-
ture and reduce the size of their workforce in response to increased 
global competition. Many discharged workers over the age of forty 
will challenge their employer's decision under the ADEA. Some 
approaches currently taken by the courts in RIF cases, however, 
have not given due consideration to the interests of employers in 
avoiding frivolous litigation. Employers who must streamline their 
production often cannot afford the litigation costs of defending 
against frivolous lawsuits. Consequently, if the prima facie case for 
RIF discrimination cases does not offer employers adequate protec-
tion from such lawsuits, many personnel choices unfortunately may 
be based on fears of litigation, rather than ability. On the other 
hand, some employers impermissibly will rely on age in deciding 
100. When a plaintiff cannot show equivalent objective qualifications, she may want to 
establish an inference of discrimination and thus a prima facie case, by showing pretext. Spe-
cifically, the plaintiff may wish to support an inference of discrimination by presenting 
pretextual evidence which suggests that either age bias or deceit entered into an employer's 
assessment of her performance. Alternatively, the plaintiff may seek to show pretext by chal-
lenging the employer's articulation of its selection criteria. In essence, the plaintiff will want 
to follow the Williams approach. However, as discussed supra section II.B, this approach 
poses numerous difficulties. 
101. Because of the evidentiary difficulties faced by the plaintiff in showing subjective 
qualifications, the hurdle faced by plaintiffs at the prima facie stage should require only that 
plaintiffs show that they possessed equivalent or superior objective qualifications to the re-
tained employee(s). However, in those rare cases where the plaintiff does not possess 
equivalent or superior objective qualifications but can manage to overcome the higher evi-
dentiary hurdle of showing clearly superior subjective qualifications, the courts should adjust 
the prima facie case and examine both subjective and objective qualifications. 
102. See Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating 
that the prima facie case serves to screen out unsubstantiated claims, thereby sparing the 
employer unnecessary litigation expense). 
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which employees to lay off. We cannot set the prima facie standard 
so high as to render the ADEA meaningless. The challenge, there-
fore, is to set a standard in the RIF context that offers employers 
protection against frivolous lawsuits while, at the same time, offer-
ing relief to those who have been discriminated against. 
Accordingly, this Note has argued that courts should require 
plaintiffs, as part of their prima facie burden, to 1) show that the 
employer had a continuing need for the work previously performed 
by the plaintiff, and 2) present evidence demonstrating that the 
plaintiff possessed substantially equivalent objective qualifications 
relative to younger employees retained by the employer. This 
prima facie burden protects employers from having to defend them-
selves against frivolous claims. At the same time, this approach 
also accomplishes the primary goal of the ADEA by ensuring that 
those RIF plaintiffs with legitimate claims are given a fair opportu-
nity to demonstrate that discriminatory action was taken against 
them. 
